But a ruling Thursday by the Washington Supreme court wasn’t about whether campaign lies are wrong; it was about who should define and punish them. By a 5-4 vote, the justices overturned the law that put the Public Disclosure Commission in the business of enforcing the truthfulness of political speech.

The outcome was right, but the issue is not black and white.

The PDC used that law to levy a $1,000 fine on a challenger, Marilou Rickert, who claimed that state Sen. Tim Sheldon, D-Hoodsport, had voted to close a youth camp. The commission determined – accurately – that the statement was an outright falsehood. She fought the fine in court, and five of the nine justices Thursday held that the Legislature shouldn’t have empowered the PDC to be the arbiter of truth in campaign rhetoric.

And it shouldn’t be. Only rarely does government have a legitimate role in policing speech. An unelected panel of governor’s appointees – the PDC – certainly shouldn’t serve as the designated truth squad in election season. Its rightful and most important role is to help the voters follow the money behind campaigns.

But Thursday’s 5-4 vote was more complex than it looks. Actually, only four of the five sounded hostile to any restriction on campaign speech. The fifth, Chief Justice Gary Alexander, emphasized a crucial distinction between ordinary political lies and defamatory attacks on a candidate’s character. The state can restrict the latter, he wrote in his concurring opinion.

Rickert’s claim fell into the garden-variety category: It was a distortion of Sheldon’s voting record, not a assertion that he was personally unsavory or corrupt. It can be hard to draw the line between such falsehoods and wild partisan spin.

Had Rickert wrongly accused Sheldon of being a sex predator, drug addict or thief, that would have been slander.

Alexander’s opinion – combined with the minority’s receptiveness to broader regulation – suggests that the court might uphold a narrowly tailored campaign measure targeting only defamation. Deterrents might take many forms. One possibility would be to make slander – if proven in a quickly convened court – grounds for holding a new election. That would get the attention of unscrupulous candidates.

But false statements about a candidate’s voting record, political views, supporters, etc., ought to be left to the marketplace of ideas. The proper remedy – prescribed by Louis Brandeis and quoted by Justice Jim Johnson in the majority opinion – is “more speech, not enforced silence.”

This means rebuttals by opponents, exposure by the media and voters who pay attention. It ultimately means that we need an electorate that abhors both lies and liars.